Joint Staff requirements to move these people, and it suited the local Muslim population and the Republican elites who were angry and upset at the Jews for, as they saw it, having the upper hand in economic matters. From their perspective it was the right thing to do if this 'project' could be achieved without causing too much trouble. But as we have seen, the plan went out of control and at that point the government was obliged to interfere and take charge.
[5] A. T.: If we look at these three rationales -economics, Turkification, and military interests -could one rank the importance of these factors?
[6] R. B.: I think the Joint Staff requirement is first; then comes (or perhaps could be ranked at the same level) the Jewish merchants' economic dominance. Turkification, I think, is the very last.
It is really just a pretext, or at least, I believe so.
[7] A. T.: It seems here that the question had an important territorial dimension. Does this analysis seem fair to you?
[8] R. B.: Yes. You know Eastern Thrace means something special for the Turkish elite. It was a region that had been invaded and re-invaded by Greeks and Bulgarians, so it was seen as a very sensitive area that had to be absolutely protected against a potential 'fifth column.' I think that is one of the main reasons why they were so sensitive in Thrace.
[9] A. T.: In fact do you think of the events of Thrace -as the euphemistic appellation was imposed for these events -as an exceptional moment or as a step in the progression of a coherent policy targeting the Jewish community?
[10] R. B.: Well, the events came as a great shock to the Jewish community in Turkey. I think they also came as a shock to the Turkish intellectuals and Republican elites. I think those in charge wanted the Jews to be moved out of the region without any fuss. But it came as great shock because it was a physical attack, a physical attack on people, on their houses, on their wealth, and so on. So it gave the supervision of the passage of the vessels to a commission. The Montreux Agreement changed these clauses and permitted the militarization of the area. Citation: 'The 1934 ( §) reminded them, as we all know, of 1933 and the Nazis in Germany. Seven years before, in 1927, they had had another problem, but not of this magnitude. It happened in Istanbul with the murder of a young girl named Elza Niego. This prompted a mass demonstration by the Jews against the Turks during the funeral. And the Turkish elites, in order to teach the Jews a lesson, claimed that the slogans used during the demonstration were an attack on Turkishness, so 10 Jews of Istanbul were prosecuted, but after 30 days they were all released. 4 That was the first shock. Then came 1934, although it cannot really be cannot be compared to this murder. First of all, it did not fit the Jewish community's conception of what the Turks, at their worst, would do to them. They were never expecting such a thing. Second, it did not fit with what we call Turkification or, whatever it is, the 'homogenization of the non-Muslims,' because you cannot Turkify people by force and by doing this kind of quasi-pogrom. I think this event has to be analyzed separately from the other ones in its own context, and explained with its own particular reasons. It cannot be compared in any way to the Varlık Vergisi events. 5 It is something particular to Thrace, for the various reasons I have discussed. And in addition to the reasons I have mentioned, there were the cases of two leading publicists at that timeCevat Rıfat Atılhan 6 and Nihal Atsız 7 -who had, before the events, been given free rein to make crude anti-Semitic propaganda with no interference from the state. Their journals were closed down only after the events. Then, in December 1934, five months after the events, Prime Minister İnönü made an official visit to the Thrace region and the cities where it happened, but he didn't pay a visit to the Jewish community leadership to ask them how they were and what their problems were. So we can see that the Jewish community was of almost no importance in the eyes of Ankara. The Ankarabased leadership didn't care about what happened to them. They didn't pay enough attention to the anti-Semitic publicists before the events, nor did they try to compensate the Jews after the events.
4 Elza Niego was a young Jewish girl who was murdered by a certain Osman Bey, who fell in love with her and murdered her because his feelings were not reciprocated. The funeral was transformed into a sort of mass demonstration of the Jews against Turks and Turkey. 5 Varlık Vergisi is a Wealth Tax that was approved by the Turkish Parliament in November 11, 1942. It aimed to tax wealth accumulated under war conditions through black marketing and war profiteering. Its application was discriminatory and arbitrary. Non Muslims were taxed prohibitively compared to Muslims of equal wealth and sent to forced labor if they could not pay the taxes, whereas Muslims who could not pay were not sent. 6 Cevat Rıfat Atılhan was an anti-semitic writer who in 1933-2,34 published İnkılap (later renamed Milli İnkılap) and tens of books.
7 Nihat Atsız (1905 Atsız ( -1975 was a nationalist writer and owner of Atsız and Orhun journals, which promoted the idea of purity of race and blood. Citation: convert non-Muslims into 'real Turks' by giving them constitutional rights was something that would remain on paper. Because in the minds of the Ankara leadership, in their collective memory, the Jewish community was still considered foreign.
[12] A. T.: Is the analysis you are offering more broadly valid for analyzing the policy of the state and the Republican elites towards the three non-Muslim communities (Armenian, Jewish and Greek)?
[13] R. B.: Of course, it can be applied to all these minorities. [15] A. T.: I too have a question that adds to this. You mentioned that there was a loss of control with regard to the initial plan. And it is not the first time that the Ankara leadership in the 1930s had to face such a loss of control. It started in the beginning of this decade with the short adventure of the Serbest Fırka party. The Kemalists seem to easily lose control of the crowds and to be afraid that the planning that they are undertaking will get out of hand. Could this be considered a particular mark of the 1930s?
[16] R. B.: In reply to the first question about the general anti-Semitic propaganda and its repercussions in Turkey, a few words on the two publicists I mentioned, Nihal Atsız and Cevat Rıfat Atilhan. We know that the latter went to Germany in 1933 and that he was in touch with the editor of Der Stürmer. 8 But Cevat Rıfat Atılhan didn't play a key role in the events because he was located in Istanbul, and he was publishing in Istanbul. At that time Nihat Atsız was a school teacher in Edirne 9 , 8 Der Stürmer was an anti-Semitic journal published by Julius Streicher. 9 Atsız was professor of literature in Edirne for 3-4 months (September 11 -December 28, 1933 ( §) in Thrace, and publishing the first issues of his journal Orhun. 10 His students were really fond of him, and he had a lot of admirers. So I think Atsız was also one factor.
[17] But I don't think the anti-Semitic propaganda was the main reason. The main reason, as mentioned before, was the Joint Staff requirement, and, secondly, the local Muslim population, which was fed up with the Jews, who were seen as dominating the economy. They were their competitors.
The 'grassroots,' so to speak, was ready for some kind of provocation. 'The provocation' is now the reply to your second question: who were the perpetrators? The perpetrators were locals, ordinary people, their neighbors.
[18] The Tenth anniversary of the foundation of the Republic, celebrated in 1933, also took place in Thrace, in Kırklareli, one year before the events. At that time Jewish-Muslim relations had seemed all right; even two months before the events, Jewish community members were interacting with their Muslim neighbors, who after a short while became their persecutors. A particularly important subgroup of perpetrators were Halkevleri youth, who in 1931 took over the Türk Ocakları, which was closed down. 11 We don't know how Ibrahim Tali, during his visit prior to the events, addressed these people. From his report we can only assume that he really provoked them, based on the conclusion he came in his report that there was a 'Jewish problem.'
[19] As for the inability of the Kemalists to control the situations they put into motion, we have a perfect case here. Because, Kemalist elites never believed that the local leadership requirements were to cause a big fuss; a quasi-tragedy which by chance they escaped. We have a document, an internal inquiry from Recep Peker, the secretary-general of the Cumhuriyet Halk Fırkası (CHF), sent to the local party organizations (unfortunately, we don't have the reply). The Peker inquiry was asking how these things happened, was the leadership aware of what had happened, and, if so, why local leaders had not informed the central organization, and so on… From this we can assume that they were suspecting something occurred with the local party organization and that these things spiraled out of control.
10 Journal published by Nihal Atsız (November 5, 1933 -July 16, 1934 [20] A. T.: A question came to me when you described the specificity of the region in Thrace: Does the fact that it is a border region explain this double nationalist sensitivity of the state's local representatives and of the population?
[21] R. B.: Yes, it can explain why Thrace is a very sensitive area for them: it is very near the Bulgarian-Greek borders, and the Bulgarians, especially, were not so positively inclined towards Turkey. Just a few months before the events we had an incident. On 17 April 1933 the Turkish nationalists youth protested the razing of the Razgrad cemetery 12 in Bulgaria. So Bulgariaespecially Bulgaria and not Greece -was seen as a big threat for Turkey. And therefore, these 'alien' people -Jews of Turkish nationality, Bulgarians of Turkish or foreign nationality -were seen as potential trouble makers.
[22] A. T.: In the book, you also tried to evaluate the repercussions of the events outside Turkey as represented in the foreign press and in the diplomatic archives. What can we say about the way the events were perceived abroad? Was there a foreign reaction that could have forced the Turkish government to reconsider the events?
[23] R. B.: Of the various archives I have studied, which were, if I remember correctly, British, German, American, Italian, Israeli, Swiss, Greek, and French, I can conclude that the international press didn't pay much attention. Let's put it this way: it was minor news. But the local diplomatic community did of course pay attention. However, they did not issue any complaint to Ankara because there were no foreign nationals among the victims. In Ankara all of the foreign diplomats held the view that the main reason for the events was the Joint Staff requirement to move them. Due to rumors that were circulating at the time, they believed that there was a conspiracy about to explode in Thrace. So the events were undertaken after some kind of planning, but the question is: did events occur as planned, or did things take a different course?
[24] A. T.: So, we lack sources.
[25] R. B.: Of course we lack sources. The main source that is missing -and it is for this reason that I could not come to a firm conclusion about the events -is the report of the Minister of 12 On April 17, 1933 militants of the Bulgarian Rodna Zaştita (Defence of the fatherland) organization destroyed the Turkish cemetery of Razgrad, in Bulgaria. As a reaction the Turkish students demonstrated in Istanbul in front of the Bulgarian consulate and marched to the Bulgarian cemetery in Istanbul. 23 students were arrested. Citation: Interior Şükrü Kaya, and his inspectors. They made a grand tour afterwards of the cities in which these events happened, but I could not find their report. The only thing I have is the official declaration of the cabinet that says that events happened, that 'we took control,' and that 'antiSemitism is an ideology alien to Turkey.'
[26] A. T.: Have we any indications of the way Germany, which had fallen under Nazi control in 1934, perceived the event?
[27] R. B.: No. I could not find interesting things about that.
[28] N. S.: Do you find similarities in the planning or in the practices between the events of Thrace and attacks against the Rum community of Istanbul in September 1955?
[29] R. B.: I think there are some similarities. The first similarity is that both events were intended to frighten the targeted people. However, in the Thrace events the aim was that Jews would move 'voluntarily' from the region, while in the September 1955 events the aim was to show the Greek government that the Turkish grassroots was extremely emotional and sensitive on the Cyprus issue and therefore if the issue was not settled according to Turkey's desire, the Rums of Istanbul would suffer since the reaction of the grassroots could not be controlled. The September 1955 events also were somehow planned, but I think they also got out of hand to a degree that the government could not have foreseen. I believe this because I don't think the government was stupid enough to plan such a visible event at the same time an international conference was taking place in Istanbul, 13 and while the international community and international press were there.
[30] Secondly, there is some sort of a similarity with local criticisms of what was perceived of as an ostentatious way of showing wealth. In Thrace, also, in the local press of that time, we see such criticism as: 'These Jews, they are wealthy, they are going to the local balls and eating well, when we, poor Turks, are suffering … '
[31] In the September 1955 events, we don't see this, but we do see there is a wild kind of vandalism in Beyoğlu because all the big shops were owned by the non-Muslims. Not only Greeks but also the Jews and Armenians were mainly in Beyoğlu and at that time the non-Muslims had still a 13 An International Police Conference. Citation: more 'ostentatious' way of living while the people who did the vandalism didn't have a penny. So there is somehow a similarity there.
[32] The third similarity, if we may say so, is how the people who were attacked became hostage to international developments that they could not control. In September 1955, the local Rum were hostage or pawn in a great chess game between Turkey and Greece. It is my opinion that
Turkey used them as leverage on the negotiation table against Greece in the Cyprus issue. In Thrace, we do not have such case, but we do have an antagonism between Turkey and Bulgaria together with the militarization of the Thrace region, which contributed to the idea that this 'alien element' should be removed.
[33] A. T.: Earlier you underlined the gap between the local representatives of the state and those at the national level, and you saw a very real difference of perception, as you discussed when you were talking about the reaction of Recep Peker. Do you think that there is also a difference in the way that the various institutions within the state are involved in the events of 1934? And more generally in their stance regarding the three non-Muslim communities?
[34] R. B.: Well, it is very difficult for me to answer because I lack primary documents. In order to answer this I would have, for example, to see how the Emniyet Genel Müdürlüğü (General Police Directorate) or the Milli İstihbarat Teşkilatı (National Intelligence Organization) was evaluating the three minorities, or to see what the Ministry of Interior thought. I haven't seen any of these documents because they are not open to researchers. So therefore it is very difficult to answer you.
[35] A. T.: Well, perhaps not particular to the event itself but looking more generally at the period from the 1920s to the 1960s, can we distinguish how different state institutions saw and treated these minorities?
[36] R. B.: I can see different things, not according to the institution but according to the minority. What was the state perspective concerning each minority? I think they were more or less categorizing the Greeks and Armenians together -although in the 1930s the Greeks were still okayin the long run they were putting them in the same basket as having a track record of betraying the fatherland during the Independence War. And therefore, they were seen, in general, as people who had to be 'watched carefully' and 'not be trusted too much'. That was also the case in the 1940s. In 1941 when all the non-Muslims were conscripted to labor battalions, what we call Yirmi Kura Nafia Citation: Askerleri. 14 Even after the 1950s, we see this problem. There was different treatment of the three minorities. The Jews were set apart because they did not have a track record of 'betrayal of the Fatherland' and were, at least in some cases, more inclined to be Turkified -we have the example of [39] R. B.: I don't think so, because politics are made by taking into consideration local sensibilities. However, it is the case that Jewish community leaders began to try to play this game.
Because after 1949, when Turkey recognized the State of Israel, Israel was always pro-Turkish. It needed a country like Turkey -a country that was Muslim, democratic, and so on -as a potential 14 In April 1941 non-Muslim men were conscripted into the Turkish Army, but instead of serving as regular soldiers they were conscripted into labor battalions and sent to work in road construction. They were released in July 1942. The main reason was that the government was afraid of fifth column infiltration if the Nazis invaded Turkey. They were very suspicious, especially of the Armenians, although not the Greeks, who were openly anti-Axis. Rıfat Bali has published recently a book on this subject entitled Yirmi Kur'a Nafıa Askerleri, Kitabevi, İstanbul, 2008 . 15 Tekin Alp or Moise Cohen (1883 -1961 . A Turkish Jewish intellectual who was a partisan of the Turkification of minorities and a fervent Kemalist. He is the author of Türkleştirme (1928), Le Kémalisme (1938) and Türk Ruhu (1944 ally. Israel always supported Turkey in all kinds of international situations and institutions; for instance, its leaders supported Turkey's membership in the United Nations in 1949. And this policy is still going on. So until July 1974 and the Turkish Armed Forces' intervention into Cyprus, the local Jewish community leadership was not a factor in this bilateral relation between Turkey and Israel. In 1974, when Turkey intervened, two big problems emerged: first, the U.S. arms embargo, and second, the American-Armenian organizations lobbying the U.S. Congress to have a bill passed to recognize the genocide. At that point Turkey needed somebody local to use as a card -in this case, the local Jewish community vis-à-vis the American Jewish community and maybe vis-à-vis Israel -to enforce their strategy of lobbying. But until 1974, this was not the case because there was no need for it; things were moving along with no problem from the Turkish side. When Turkey had a problem in 1974, then this required the local community to intervene on Turkey's behalf, and this made many people in the local Jewish community, which until 1974 had practically no leverage vis-à-vis Ankara, extremely happy. I mean le malheur des uns fait le bonheur des autres (one person's misery is another's happiness). They were extremely happy that they had the occasion to at least show that they were 'real' citizens. This is what Professor Riva Kastoryano calls 'integration coming from abroad.' 16 [40] A. T.: I would like, if it is possible, to return to a subject we have already mentioned when we spoke about your last book. Turkification seems to be for a number of authors to be a continuous concern of the state throughout the Turkish Republic, and as a concern that determines the policy of the state towards minorities. It is today a privileged paradigm. What would you say about it?
[41] R. B.: I think two things have to be considered. First of all, Turkification has an extremely negative connotation today in the Turkish intellectual arena because Turkification, from the intellectuals' perspective, is assimilation. Moreover, it is seen not only as assimilation but as the so long as they became 'Turks.' This would mean not only that they spoke Turkish fluently but that they would become 'Turks' in their heart, ideals, and minds, that they would get rid of their particularism -whether it be Hellenism or Zionism or Armenian nationalism -and embrace Turkish nationalism. In return, what they were promised was equality in all public domains. But this did not happen; this was left on paper as constitutional rights but never implemented. And the only explanation I see for this is that the social memory of the Turkish Republic, which is the inheritance of 700 years of an empire run by sharia, was still strong after 1923, that the Republican elites and the intellectual elites still considered the non-Muslims as dhimmis. 17 [42] To be more precise, I think (even if I can't prove it) there were two factions: one faction (we don't know if it was dominant at the beginning or not) was an idealistic faction that believed this would be the way to create a new citizen status in Turkey, and then another faction, that in the end became dominant, which still considered them dhimmis, not to be trusted too much, with all the repercussions we have seen in the single-party period. How do I come to this conclusion? The only document I found, which is an American Intelligence report prepared in 1946, is quite interesting. It is a report by the American Intelligence, OSS people, in Istanbul referring to what a Jewish leader of the period, whose name is not given, has to say about the 1930s. According to him the Turkish Jewish leadership understood that there was no other option but to be Turkified. So, he continues, 'how can we Turkify the Jewish future generation, the young people? The only way is to turn our schools into Maarif Vekaleti's schools 18 or to close them down. To turn them into such schools with all the conversion expenses supported by the Jewish leadership.' So they went to Ankara to propose this but were refused. And the only explanation given by the anonymous Jewish leader about why Ankara refused is that according to him the Turks wanted the Jews to remain Jews and not assimilate into Turkishness so that they could be identified. The idea was, 'We don't need them to be Turkified, we need to be able to identify them so that, eventually, we can squeeze them financially.' Some events happened in the single-party period in which Turkey was in a different context; and some happened after 1946 where Turkey was part of the Western world. So you cannot explain these events through one single reason: that is, the will of the state to Turkify all these people. It is not so simple. Each event has to be evaluated in its own context. After 1946, the 1955 events for me indicate something that is still valid today: that the non-Muslims in the multi-party period became hostages to a situation they could not control and in which they are not the dominant actors. This situation involves Turkey's international development and relations with other states concerning its borders, and the non-Muslims are used as a pawn on the master chess game, the Jews included.
[48] A. T.: To continue this analysis and build on the critique you make of the idea of Turkification, it seems that in the relationship between physical displacement and aggression against the community, the events of 1934 are very unusual. If we tried to relate these events to the waves of emigration outside Turkey during these years, can we find a correlation between the policy towards the Jewish community and emigration? wave. But the big wave came at the end of 1948, which was the accumulation of all these negative feelings in the social memory of the Jews: 1934 Jews: , 1941 , the conscription of non-Muslims, and 1942, during which they suffered economically the most. So they came to the conclusion that they had no future here and they left en masse after 1948. During 1955, we do see a few thousand people who left for Israel because some Jews had their shops damaged; they lost money and, besides, there was a great loss of confidence in the Turkish state. Then we do see migration in the opposite direction, after the Six Days War in 1967, which gave some kind of Zionist pride to the youngsters in Turkey.
So the emigration of Jews is closely linked either to particular moments or violence and oppression or, like in the 1970s, social and economic turmoil in Turkey. In the 1970s there was a continuous wave of emigration from Turkey, which stopped in the 1980s.
[52] A. T.: Can we make the same analysis for the other non-Muslim communities?
[53] R. B.: I haven't seen demographic data. But for the Armenians -and this is a subjective evaluation -we do have it of course after the Varlık Vergisi. Recently someone told me that most moved to South America. For the period after 1955, I don't know the numbers, but in the 1970s they left as well, because -as we all may remember -1973 was the first murder of a Turkish diplomat by an American Armenian in San Francisco, and, if I remember correctly, after that came ASALA. So the Armenians themselves were hostages of a situation that they did not control, and they were under too much pressure, so they left.
[54] A. T.: Let us return now to what constitutes the essential object of your study, a topic you get at not only in this book about the events of 1934 but also in many of the works you published before. The question is related to the one I asked you about the possible link between the status of the community and emigration. What is your feeling on the general problem of this notion of demographic engineering, and on its relevance in the case of the history of the last decades of the Ottoman Empire and the Republic? Have there been any major changes in the mentality of the state on these questions since the development of its policies after World War I?
